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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1963 Survey of this subject, the author suggested that Florida
family law was in need of a "restatement prepared by experts . . ."I The
Florida Bar has more than met this need by publishing Florida Family
Law. This work is modestly described in the preface as a "how-to-do-it
publication"; a tome of 1592 pages of this scope and quality deserves a
better appellation. Florida Family Law does not purport to be a restate-
ment, but it is a superb statement of the "living law" prepared by prac-
titioners who help make this law live.
The Florida courts displayed much greater attention to their prior
cases than this author observed in the periods discussed in the 1.963 and
1966 Surveys.'
The Florida Legislature is to be commended for its action in abolish-
ing common law marriages in this state;' many other legislative amend-
ments and additions which were made could have been left un-made with-
out loss to anyone.
II. MARRIAGE
A. Miscegenation Laws
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Virginia
statute forbidding marriage between white and colored persons is uncon-
stitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The holding of this case, although limited to a
marriage issue, would seem to indicate that any "racially-drawn" statute
forbidding sexual congress as a result of fornication or adultery may also
have a short life.'
B. Common Law Marriages
After the proponent of an alleged common law marriage has estab-
lished a prima facie case, the burden of disproving the marriage shifts to
the person asserting its illegality. Application of this rule is particularly
warranted when the alleged common law marriage is a remarriage of the
parties after they have been divorced.' The testimony of an attorney for
a deceased man that the deceased had told the attorney that he did not
"consider Virginia his common law wife"' would not be enough to rebut
the presumption of a valid common law marriage which was established
by "habit and repute."'
1. Murray, Family Law, Survey of Florida Law 18 U. MAmi L. REV. 231, 233 (1963).
2. Murray, Family Law, Survey of Florida Law 18 U. Mimi L. REV. 231 (1963);
Murray, Family Law, Survey of Florida Law 20 U. MiAmi L. REV. 561 (1966).
3. See note 8, infra.
4. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. In re Estate of Beacher, 177 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
6. In re Estate of Alcala, 188 So.2d 903, 908 (emphasis by court) (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
7. Id. at 905.
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C. Legislation
At long last, the legislature has provided that common law marriages
entered into after January 1, 1968, shall be invalid.8 The courts will con-
tinue to be faced for many years with common law marriages allegedly
entered into prior to this date.
D. Annulment
In a husband's suit for divorce and the wife's counterclaim for sepa-
rate maintenance it is error for the chancellor to invite either party to
amend his or her case by asking for an annulment and then to grant an
annulment when the husband amends his complaint. A party may amend
his pleadings to conform with the proof in order to bring the pleadings in
line with the actual issues tried, but this procedure is not permissible
when it changes the theory on which the case was tried.9
E. Jurisdiction and Venue for Divorce
1. JURISDICTION
When a wife files suit for separate maintenance alleging cruelty
(under section 65.09) and obtains personal service upon her husband and
he then returns to a foreign state, the wife may thereafter file an amended
complaint for divorce upon the same charges of cruelty by serving the
amended complaint upon her husband's attorney. It is not necessary for
the wife to re-serve the husband by constructive service by publication.
This will be true even though the wife has not satisfied the six months
residency requirement for divorce until immediately before she filed the
amended complaint; the residency requirement affects only the jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of divorce and not the jurisdiction over the
person.' 0
Prohibition will not lie to review a trial court's order overruling a
challenge to its jurisdiction over the person when it has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a suit for alimony unconnected with divorce." A
chancellor has no power to order the defendant in a final decree of divorce
to "cooperate with plaintiff in obtaining a Jewish divorce . ..
A plaintiff's sworn statement "that the defendant is a citizen and
resident of Lewisburg, West Virginia, and receives her mail at P.O. Box
83 in said city" is a sufficient compliance with the Florida statutes 8 gov-
8. Fla, Laws 1967, ch. 67-571, Comm. Substitute for H.B. No. 1317.
9. Sack v. Sack, 184 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
10. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 187 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
11. State v. Kehoe, 179 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
12. Turner v. Turner, 192 So.2d 787, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
13. FLA. STAT. § 48.04(1) (1965).
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erning service by publication. 4 When the statement alleges the residence
of the defendant in a positive and unequivocable manner, it is not neces-
sary to allege that the affiant has made a diligent search and inquiry to
discover the residence of the defendant. Further, when the statement
specifies that the defendant's residence is in a small town and includes his
mailing address, this is substantial compliance with the statute even with-
out the allegation that the residence is stated "as particularly as is known
to the affiant."' 5 It should be noted that if the defendant is a resident of
a large city, the above form would not be a substantial compliance with
the statute.
2. VENUE
A defendant who fails to include the defense of improper venue in
his motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action waives any
right to assert this defense. Further, a motion to transfer the divorce ac-
tion to another county for purposes of trial convenience is unauthorized."
III. DIVORCE
A. Grounds for Divorce
Generally, false and unfounded accusations of infidelity may con-
stitute extreme cruelty. However, they will not if the accused spouse has
provoked them by her own conduct which gives reasonable foundation for
a belief in the truth of the accusations even though they are false in fact.'
The third district has held that the following allegations are insuffi-
cient to constitute extreme cruelty:
The defendant, however, has throughout most of the marriage,
demonstrated an attitude of super-sensitivity, especially in mat-
ters of triviality; has constantly criticized and belittled plaintiff,
both privately and in the presence of friends; has left the home
for hours at a time without explanation when things did not suit
him; and has, in general, created and maintained an air of
tenseness and strain which has caused constant and considerable
mental and physical pain and anguish to plaintiff, at times re-
quiring medical care and attention. By reason of these things,
and others not mentioned herein, plaintiff charges defendant
with extreme cruelty.'8
14. Walton v. Walton, 181 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
15. Id. See Larsen v. Larsen, 180 So.2d 393 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1965), which reviews the
required diligent search and inquiry rules governing service of process by constructive
service.
16. Brennan v. Brennan, 192 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
17. Oncay v. Oncay, 183 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
18. Morgan v. Morgan, 180 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). See Steele v. Steele, 177
So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), which illustrates facts showing "mental cruelty" as grounds
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A divorce will not be granted in Florida upon the uncorroborated
testimony of the plaintiff.' 9 Furthermore, the testimony of a husband
asserting extreme cruelty will not be corroborated when his wife admits,
after being called as an adverse witness, that she changed the ownership
of a savings account and government bonds from joint ownership to sole
ownership in her name.2° Lawyers who are as acquisitive as the author
may disagree with this holding.
B. Defenses
The doctrine of recrimination should not be applied unless a party
seeks to take advantage of an act or omission which he himself has in-
duced. The doctrine may be invoked because of the nature of the wrong,
either for the benefit of the court and society or for the benefit of the de-
fendant in order to prevent one party from taking an unfair advantage of
the other." A divorce will be denied to either party when they fail to make
a showing of sufficient equity on their own behalf or a lack of equity in
the other party and when both parties have violated the clean hands
doctrine.22
When a husband has asserted a counterclaim asking for a divorce in
the wife's suit for separate maintenance and he has refused to answer
questions dealing with his improper relationship with another woman, it
is error for the chancellor to permit him to assert his privilege against
self-incrimination without penalizing him by striking his counterclaim. 3
The party to a divorce who pleads res judicata has the burden of proving
this affirmative defense, and this burden will not be met by the mere in-
troduction of a copy of a decree of a foreign state.24
C. Procedure
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1.940 provides that in
any action wherein a person in military service is involved either as a
plaintiff or defendant, the court shall stay the proceedings at his request
"unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute
the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially
affected by reason of his military service."25 If the plaintiff's ability is not
"materially affected by . . . his military service" the court may deny a
stay of the proceedings. This would seem particularly true if the plaintiff-
for divorce. Compare this case with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110 which permits a very generalized
allegation of extreme cruelty. See Form 1.943, FLA. R. Civ. P., 1967 Revision.
19. Simkins v. Simkins, 198 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
20. Doyle v. Doyle, 189 So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
21. Spencer v. Spencer, 193 So.2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
22. Sharp v. Sharp, 185 So.2d 508 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
23. Nuckols v. Nuckols, 189 So.2d 832 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
24. Harless v. Harless, 185 So.2d 728 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
25. 50 U.S.C., App. § 521.
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husband after instituting a divorce suit has done nothing to prosecute it
and has not complied with a separation agreement which was entered into
at his instance and which was prepared by his attorney before the suit
was filed.26
D. Recognition of and Vacating of Decrees
The Third District Court of Appeal has refused to recognize a
Mexican divorce decree which was granted to a Florida husband against
his wife who was a resident of Florida when all acts of alleged cruelty
occurred in Florida, the Mexican ground for divorce was not one accorded
by Florida law and the husband failed to prove that he was a resident of
Mexico at the time of the divorce.2 7 From the language of the opinion, it
is difficult to determine whether the court voided the decree on the basis
that the Mexican court lacked jurisdiction, or that the ground for divorce
was one not recognized in Florida or for a combination of these two rea-
sons. This opinion further confuses the already confused "comity" doc-
trine in Florida.
Rule 1.38(b) of the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provided
that judgments or decrees procured by fraud could be set aside by a
motion filed in the case within a reasonable time, but not later than one
year after the entry of the decree or judgment. However, this rule does
not prevent an independent suit being filed during this period to attack a
decree obtained by fraud (this holding was incorporated in Rule 1.540(b)
of the 1967 Revision of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure). As a re-
sult, when a husband falsely swears in his affidavit for constructive service
of process that his wife is concealing herself in order to prevent personal
service of process upon her when in fact the wife is "temporarily residing"
at a known address in a foreign state, he has committed a fraud upon the
court and the decree may be set aside.28
A divorce decree may be set aside for fraud if the affidavit for service
of process was false in that the affiant knowingly gave a false address or
stated that the address of the defendant 'was unknown. However, the
burden of proof is on the person alleging fraud, especially when the party
charged with making the false affidavit is dead.29
A chancellor may refuse to vacate an order modifying a divorce de-
cree upon the petition of the husband when the wife has died subsequent
to the entry of the modified order and the husband has not substituted
the representative of the deceased wife's estate as a party to the case. 0 If
a chancellor has vacated a decree pro confesso it is error to vacate por-
26. Robbins v. Robbins, 193 So.2d 471 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
27. Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
28. Corrigan v. Corrigan, 184 So.2d 644 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
29. Gravel v. Bailey, 187 So.2d 667 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
30. Chaachou v. Hughes, 177 So.2d 554 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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tions of the final decree of divorce; the divorce decree must be vacated in
its entirety.81
E. Taxation of Costs and Suit Money
In the absence of any procedural court rule regarding the taxing of
costs, the first district has stated (in a divorce case) that the successful
party should file a motion or other application to tax costs to which
should be attached a verified statement of the items claimed as costs. A
copy of this motion or application should be served upon the opposing
party a reasonable time before the court enters the final decree or judg-
ment in order for the opposing party to be able to file objections. The
court should then conduct a hearing to adjudicate the motion and objec-
tions to it. The court held that it was error to adjudicate costs as to mat-
ters which were not in evidence and without notice to the adverse party.82
The third district has intimated that a chancellor has discretion to
order the husband to pay for services incurred by the wife for the services
of private investigators used in preparing her case under the idea that this
would be classified as "suit money" pursuant to section 65.07 of the
Florida Statutes. However, the court refused to reverse the chancellor
who had denied an award because the court was "not convinced that the
chancellor clearly abused his discretion in denying suit money to the wife
for this purpose .... "31
F. Legislation
The divorce statutes, sections 65.01-.09, 65.101, 65.11, 65.13, 65.14
and 65.15-.21 of the Florida Statutes, have been transferred to chapter 61
as a part of the revision of civil procedure sponsored by The Florida
Bar.3
4
IV. ALIMONY
A. Jurisdiction
When a wife brings a suit for divorce and seeks to enjoin a foreign
corporation (a majority of whose stock is owned by her husband) which
has not qualified to do business in Florida from disposing of its assets or
removing them from Florida, service of process against the corporation is
insufficient even though the president of the corporation was personally
served while passing through Florida. The Florida Statutes5 require that
service may be made on a foreign corporation when the cause of action
31. Preston v. Preston, 201 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
32. Burnett v. Burnett, 197 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
33. Simkins v. Simkins, 198 So.2d 648, 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
34. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, S.B. No. 441.
3$. FT,. STAT. " 47.16-47.171 (1965),
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arises out of a transaction or operation connected with or incidental to
the activities of the corporation in Florida, and seemingly the hiding of
assets would not meet this requisite. 6
The circuit court for one county has the power to impose an equitable
lien upon property located in another county when the property is owned
by a non-resident and is specifically described in a notice by publication
which states that the property is being proceeded against for payment of
alimony and child support in a divorce suit.37
B. Right to Alimony
A wife may allege as a ground for divorce that her husband had a
living spouse at the time of their marriage and may receive alimony from
him upon divorce provided that she is the innocent victim of his fraud.38
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the Third District Court
of Appeal, has held that a bigamous second marriage entered into by a
divorced woman will not serve to bar her rights to receive alimony from
her first husband under the terms of the original divorce decree. The
rationale is that a bigamous marriage is void and therefore ineffective to
alter the legal rights of the former wife and her first husband. 9
C. Temporary Alimony
It is reversible error for a chancellor in considering an award of
temporary alimony in a divorce action to take judicial notice of the record
in a separate divorce action between the parties even though he was the
chancellor in the prior proceedings. ° The rules ought to provide that a
chancellor has the power to adopt the record (or a portion of it) of a prior
proceeding and incorporate it into a subsequent proceeding in order to
avoid needless expense.
D. Criteria for the Award
When a forty-one-year-old man marries a twenty-one-year-old woman
and they separate after four days of marriage, it is error for the chancellor
to hold that the wife's age, condition of health, education and ability to
earn a living, the short duration of the marriage and the minimal change
in the circumstances of the parties are immaterial matters in considering
whether to award alimony.41
A wife is not entitled to an award of permanent alimony when it is
36. Manus v. Manus, 193 So.2d 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
37. Wheatland Hills Corp. v. Morton, 199 So.2d 122 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
38. Brown v. Brown, 186 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1966).
39. Reese v. Reese, 192 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1966), rev'g Reese v. Reese, 178 So.2d 913 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965).
40. Novack v. Novack, 196 So.2d 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
41. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 189 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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her second marriage, the marriage lasted only three months, she has lost
nothing by the marriage, she is able to support herself and when she
entered the first sour note in this marriage by announcing on the
second or third day after the wedding that she did not care what
she did or what [her husband] did, but since he had married her,
he was going to support her the rest of his life.42
It is to be wondered if this woman was penalized for articulating a motive
which many wives are too discreet to utter.
E. Discovery of Assets
Under Rules 1.21(b), 1.27 and 1.28, of the 1954 Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, a wife is entitled to an order which orders the husband to
produce a copy of his income tax return and a list of his assets together
with valuations and location, even when the husband admits (through his
attorney) in writing that he has assets in excess of five million dollars and
the ability to support his dependents. The wife and the court are entitled
to the whole truth "to the end that an independent complete understand-
ing and evaluation may be had.""8
In a similar vein, a husband's statement during the taking of his
deposition that "I am ready, willing and able to answer any reasonable
order for costs, fees or other allowances" is not a proper demonstration
to the court of his ability and willingness to pay such amounts as may
reasonably be decreed. 4 Hence, the court is justified in ordering that he
produce copies of his income tax returns which were filed during the
marriage.
F. "Go-way Money"
In addition to permanent alimony and lump-sum alimony, the Su-
preme Court of Florida and the First District Court of Appeal have
apparently countenanced a new concept known as "go-way" money. A
chancellor may award a nominal sum for a limited number of months as
"'go-way' money like severance pay to aid in the re-orientation of the
recipient" even though she is guilty of adultery.45 The Great Society has
evidently made an imprint on Florida divorce law.
G. Amounts
The first district has refused to reverse an alimony and child support
decree which left the husband with $49.47 per month for the first six
42. Gordon v. Gordon, 192 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
43. Parker v: Parker, 182 So.2d 498, 500 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). Accord, Orlowitz v.
Orlowitz, 199 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1967), rev'g Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 187 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966) ; See 22 U. MIAmi L. REV. 195 (1967).
44. Ortiz v. Ortiz, 194 So.2d 38, 39-40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
45. Brackin v. Brackin, 190 So.2d 816, 817 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Brackin v. Brackin,
182 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1966).
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months after the decree and $74.47 per month thereafter. The court threw
a bone to the husband by providing that "[I]f there are changed circum-
stances, arising out of the employment of the wife, the way is clearly open
to apply for relief under the reservation of jurisdiction."" And lawyers
and judges wonder why laymen are disenchanted with the legal profession.
It is an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to award only two hun-
dred dollars a month as alimony when the record shows that the former
wife needs nine hundred and forty dollars per month to live and the hus-
band is worth in excess of 250,000 dollars.
H. Lump-Sum Alimony
A chancellor who awards lump sum alimony to the wife in an amount
which is based, in part, upon the fact that the wife is concurrently suing
her husband on an alimony judgment of a foreign state, should reserve
jurisdiction over the awarding of alimony for further consideration in the
event that the foreign judgment is invalidated because of lack of jurisdic-
tion over the husband."8 When a property settlement agreement (which is
made part of a divorce decree) provides for lump sum alimony but fails
to provide for the time of payment except for a provision that the husband
is to pay interest on the sum until it is paid, the wife has the right to de-
termine when it should be paid.49
I. Reserving Jurisdiction to Award Alimony
A series of three cases illustrate the problems arising when a final
decree of divorce fails to award alimony and fails to reserve jurisdiction
in the court to award it at a later date. The third district has held that it
is error for the chancellor to deny an award of alimony without reserving
jurisdiction to award it in the future if it should become necessary. °
However, the fourth district has refused to follow the rule of the third
district by holding that "[W]here a wife has no absolute right to alimony,
she also has no absolute right to a provision in the decree denying alimony
that reserves jurisdiction for the purpose of awarding alimony in the
future.""
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the third district, has
held that when a chancellor enters a divorce decree and fails to reserve
jurisdiction to award alimony in the future, the divorced wife is unable
46. Wiebe v. Wiebe, 190 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
47. Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So.2d 744 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). The third district
awarded the wife six hundred dollars per month, rather than remanding the case to the
chancellor because of his death during the pendency of the appeal.
48. Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 187 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 199 So.2d 97'(Fla.. 1967).
49. Clem v. Clem, 183 So.2d 742' (Fla. 3dDist. 1966).
50. Steele v. Steele, 177 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
51. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 189 So.2d 499
.
501 .(Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
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to re-open the divorce proceedings two years after the divorce decree be-
came final. A final decree passes out of the control of the court and is not
subject to modification after the passage of time provided in the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court stated that this holding was to be
without prejudice to any independent proceeding which the wife may
have to alimony.52
J. Modification of the Award
A chancellor may refuse to reduce an award of alimony (which was
based upon a separation agreement) upon the ground that the former
husband's income has diminished because of a change in his business in-
vestments when this diminishment must have been contemplated by him
when he executed the separation agreement, and he is unable to show that
the change has materially affected his standard of living or financial
ability to pay. This is particularly true when the former husband is un-
able to show that his change of economic position is of a permanent
rather than a temporary nature.53
The mere fact a former husband has remarried and assumed the
custody and support of his children who were in the custody of a relative
of the husband is not a sufficient change of facts to justify a reduction of
alimony payments which were based upon a property settlement agree-
ment incorporated in the divorce decree.54
In Ropke v. Ropke55 the chancellor reduced the amount of weekly
alimony payments for a temporary period because the former wife had
cashed an insurance policy belonging to the former husband. The district
court of appeal affirmed by saying:
Without deciding whether the Chancellor was correct as to the
ownership of the insurance policy or not, we are of the opinion
that the Chancellor was within his rights in reducing the ali-
mony payments for any period of time he saw fit and it is
immaterial as to what the Chancellor's reasons were. (emphasis
added) ."
Surely, this is merely loose wording by the court, but it is the kind of
loose wording that will plague the court in future cases.
A chancellor who discharges a rule to show cause because the hus-
band had complied with a prior support order has no authority to modify
the amount of support in the absence of pleadings requesting this action.5 7
52. Coleman v. Coleman, 190 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1966), rev'g Coleman v. Coleman, 180
So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
53. Tewksbury v. Tewksbury, 178 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
54. Bagley v. Bagley, 182 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
55. Ropke v. Sopke, 179 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
56. Id. at 123.
57. Petrucci v. Petrucci, 199 So.2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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K. Enforcement of the Award
A final decree of divorce which orders the divorced husband to pay a
civil judgment entered against the wife by a third party who was not
a party to the divorce suit may not be enforced by contempt proceedings.
Contempt jurisdiction is limited to the enforcement of claims for alimony
and support. If the chancellor attempts to enforce a decree of this nature
by contempt proceedings, a writ of prohibition will be granted. 8
Although a judgment of contempt is defective when it fails to fix the
amount of unpaid temporary alimony and the period for which the con-
temptor shall be held imprisoned unless he purges himself of contempt by
payment, this deficiency may be cured when the final decree includes
these missing items.59
L. Foreign Alimony Decrees
Under the law of New York there is no authority for the bringing of
a suit at law to recover the arrears in payments awarded by the Domestic
Relations Court of the City of New York. Consequently, a suit at law
may not be brought in Florida.6"
A Nevada divorce decree ordering that the former husband pay sup-
port and maintenance to the wife until her death or remarriage in accord-
ance with the separation agreement executed by the parties will be
enforced in Florida as a charge against the husband's estate after his
death. The court was careful to note that an award of alimony will not
survive the husband's death; however, a decree which incorporates a
separation agreement providing for support until the death or re-marriage
of the wife will survive the husband's death.6"
M. Appeals of Decrees
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that a wife may accept
alimony and support payments ordered by the trial court without estop-
ping herself from appealing as to the amount of the award. The court
further held that Appellate Rule 3.8(b), which permits a wife to apply
to the lower court for alimony or support money for children pending the
appeal, is remedial in nature and its non-use does not affect the rights
of anyone.62
58. State ex rel Gillham v. Phillips, 193 So.2d 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
59. Saunders v. Saunders, 183 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
60. Levantin v. First Nat'l Bank, 183 So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
61. Hazlewood v. Hazlewood, 178 So.2d 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
62. Brackin v. Brackin, 182 So.2d 1, 6-7 (Fla. 1966). The key to the holding seems to
be contained in the following language: "In the absence of other intervening or controlling
equities, when the husband is not injured or prejudiced in any way by the wife receiving the
money, there is no waiver or estoppel in merely the payment or receipt of the alimony pur-
suant to order of court." Accord, Blue v. Blue, 183 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1966) ; Lyons v. Lyons,
200 So.2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), and Hines v. Hines, 184 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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V. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Community Property
An interesting question involving community property under the
law of Cuba was at issue in de Quintana v. de Ordono.6" While the spouses
were domiciled in Cuba, the husband acquired corporate stock in a Flor-
ida corporation. Cuban law provides that all property of the marriage
shall be considered as community property until proven to be the separate
property of the husband or wife. The court held that the domicile of the
couple determines that the movable property-the corporate stock-is
owned equally by them. Subsequently, the couple changed their domicile
to Florida and the husband exchanged the stock for a promissory note,
and the court held that this latter transaction was governed by Florida
law. Under Florida law if a part of the consideration belongs to the wife
and title is taken in the husband's name alone, the law then creates a
resulting trust to the extent that her property was used to acquire the
new asset. Therefore, the husband (and the administrators of his estate)
held title to a one-half interest in trust for the widow.
B. Execution by Creditors
The property of a judgment debtor husband which is in the hands
of his wife may be ordered sold to satisfy the judgment. However, when
the wife claims title to the property adversely to her husband and the
judgment creditor, her rights in the property may not be cut off in pro-
ceedings supplementary to execution unless she is fully impleaded in
the case. 4
C. Insurance
A life insurance policy which by its terms provides that it is payable
to the estate of the insured is payable under a Florida statute65 to the
surviving children and spouse in equal portions. In effect, the statute
writes in the names of these persons in the policy.6
D. Estates by the Entirety
The fourth district has held67 that an estate by the entirety can be
converted into an estate in common by a separation agreement between
the spouses which clearly indicates this intent and which is executed in
conformity with the Florida Statute providing that a married woman has
63. de Quintana v. de Ordono, 195 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
64. State v. Kehoe, 189 So.2d 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
65. FLA. STAT. § 222.13 (1965).
66. Clemons v. Clemons, 197. So.2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
67. Snow v. Matthews, 190 So.2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
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"the power to execute and acknowledge deeds to property owned by her
or by herself and her husband as tenants by the entirety .... 368
In the absence of pleadings and proof, it is error for a chancellor to
award a husband his wife's interest in an estate by the entirety, because
such an estate becomes a tenancy in common upon divorce. Further, it
is error to award corporate stock to the husband when the stock was in
the sole name of the wife in the absence of allegations and proof that this
stock was not the separate property of the wife or that it was subject to
some equitable interest or lien of the husband.69
When a tenancy by the entireties is converted into a tenancy in
common by divorce, one of the tenants may hold the property adversely
to the other by returning the property for taxation as her sole property,
by paying all of the taxes on the property and by retaining sole possession
of it.70
It is error for the court to award the husband exclusive occupancy
and possession of the home and its furnishings and furniture when he does
not deny his obligation to support the children and does not ask for sole
use of the marital home, which is held as an estate by the entirety.
71
E. Partition
A chancellor does not have the authority to order the partition and
sale of an estate by the entirety in a divorce case in the absence of an
agreement or pleadings asking for partition to be granted upon the entry
of the divorce decree.71 It would appear that when a former wife has
been awarded possession of an estate by the entirety, which became a
tenancy in common upon divorce, she is not liable for the rental value
of the property when a partition action is brought by the former hus-
band.7
Although a chancellor may be justified in decreeing partition of
jointly held personal property in a somewhat informal manner after he
has granted a divorce, he may not do so unless Florida Statutes, sections
66.06 and 66.07 (1965) are complied with.74
68. FLA. STAT. § 708.09 (1965).
69. Glasser v. Glasser, 178 So.2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); for further proceedings, see
Glasser v. Glasser, 190 So.2d 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
70. Kennedy v. Vandine, 185 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1966).
71. Berger v. Berger, 182 So.2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
72. Schultz v. Schultz, 197 So.2d 310 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
73. Joyner v. Rogers, 182 So.2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). Hickman v. Hickman, 177
So.2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), discusses damages for use of the house after a partition judg-
ment between a former husband and wife.
74. Lubarr v. Lubarr, 199 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). See also Greene v. Greene,
199 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
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F. Inter-spousal Transactions to Defeat Creditors
The third district has held that a husband who formed a corpora-
tion and had all of its stock issued to his wife in order to protect his
"cearning capacity" from a tort suit filed against the husband's partner-
ship is guilty of a fraudulent conveyance and he will not be able to re-
cover the stock from his wife even though the tort judgment has been
satisfied.7 However, the Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the
view of the district court of appeal that the husband had a fraudulent
intent. The supreme court, in reversing the district court, held that the
real object of the husband's transactions was to change a partnership
into a corporate enterprise and the transfer of the partnership assets to
the corporation was to facilitate this change in the manner of doing busi-
ness and not to defraud a tort creditor who received a judgment subse-
quent to the formation of the corporation. Further, the judgment creditor
was not hindered in any manner in the settlement of his judgment. As a
result, the husband was held entitled to the return of the stock from his
wife."
G. Presumptions of a Gift
A transfer of property from a husband to a wife is presumed to be
a gift; however, a transfer by the wife to the husband is not, and the hus-
band has the burden of proving that any transfer from the wife is dona-
tive in nature." Conclusive evidence is necessary to overcome the pre-
sumption of a gift to the wife upon a transfer to an estate by the entirety.
This burden of proof is not met by the husband when the evidence shows
that the husband conveyed the property to himself and his wife as an
estate by the entirety in order to secure a loan from a lender who insisted
upon this conveyance as a condition for making a loan secured by a
mortgage.78
When the husband's funds have been used to purchase real property
in the name of the husband and wife as joint tenants and there is no
evidence to rebut the presumption of a gift, it is erroneous for the chan-
cellor to order the wife upon divorce to convey her interest to her hus-
band.79
H. Special Equities Rule
A wife may not be given a "special equity" in her husband's property
merely because she has been a dutiful wife. However, she will be entitled
to a special equity if property is acquired from funds received in the sale
75. Sponholtz v. Sponholtz, 180 So.2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
76. Sponholtz v. Sponholtz, 190 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1966).
77. Olsen v. Olsen, 195 So.2d 864 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
78. Holton v. Holton, 189 So.2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
79. Smith v. Smith, 177 So.2d 351 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See Porterfield v. Porterfield,
181 So.2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), which held that a transfer of corporate stock to the wife
as an estate by the entirety was a present gift and not one in the future.
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of a home residence which was originally in their joint names, or because
the husband used his home for his business office and the wife was his
"right arm" in assisting him in his business affairs."
An unusual application of the "special equities" rule was involved
in Bullard v. Bullard.8 A wife left her husband and minor son and al-
legedly withdrew the couple's life savings from a bank. The wife returned
later to the marital domicile (held as an estate by the entirety) and shot
the husband, causing him to be incapacitated. The wife was convicted in
the criminal court. The chancellor ruled that he did not have jurisdiction
to award the wife's tenancy in common interest to the husband. The
second district disagreed with the chancellor's view that he lacked
jurisdiction and remanded the case to the chancellor to take further testi-
mony relative to the alleged withdrawal of the bank account as a factor
to be considered in the possible awarding of the wife's interest in the home
to the husband.
A husband may be compelled to answer interrogatories concerning
his financial worth when his wife seeks a special interest in his property
based upon her industry and services used in the acquisition of his prop-
erty. 2 A wife who claims a special equity in the assets of her husband
has the burden to prove, to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, that she
either contributed financially to the husband's business or to the acquisi-
tion of property, or that her personal services contributed materially to
his acquisition of property.83
I. Miscellaneous
A Florida court may decline to enjoin a husband from continuing
his suit in New York against a bank (which is custodian of securities
held by the husband and wife) to compel it to deliver the securities to
him when the New York litigation will not be vexatious and expensive
to a wife who has adequate means for protecting her rights in New York.8 4
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Jurisdiction to Award And to Enforce The Award
A trial court is without jurisdiction to fix attorney's fees for service
rendered in the district courts of appeal and the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, even though the parties have stipulated to this in the trial court;
jurisdiction may not be conferred by stipulation.8
When the Supreme Court of Florida has failed to rule expressly
upon a motion for attorney's fees for the appeal, as provided for in the
80. William v. Williams, 177 So.2d 865, 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
81. 195 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
82. Novack v. Novack, 187 So.2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
83. Tanner v. Tanner, 194 So.2d 702 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
84. Mullinix v. Mullinix, 182 So.2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
85. Howell v. Howell, 183 So.2d 261 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), applying FLA. APP. R. 3.16.
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Florida Appellate Rules,86 it will be considered as the equivalent of a
denial of attorney's fees. Thus, the trial court, upon remand of the case,
has no jurisdiction to award attorney's fees for the appeal.87
In a somewhat inconsistent vein, the third district has held that
a former wife is entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending an attempt to modify the provisions of a property settlement
agreement, and an appellate court may direct the trial court to deter-
mine, upon remand of the case, the amount of attorney's fees to be
awarded for services performed in the appellate court.8 There is no
authority which permits a chancellor to set the amount of attorney's fees
for the husband in a divorce case, and any imposition of an attorney's
lien for such a fee would be premature.8 9
The third district has held that a Florida attorney may not com-
mence a suit for attorney's fees by attachment of real property owned
by his former clients who are non-residents at the time of suit when the
amount of attorney's fees is entirely conjectural and unliquidated. The
Florida attachment statute9° which permits attachment for a "debt or
the sum demanded" is to be narrowly construed to mean the historic,
common law term of the action of debt for a sum certain."
A Florida statute provides that the decision of an appellate court
shall be executed by the officers of the lower court without expressed
direction of the appellate court.9 2 Therefore, a trial court has the au-
thority to execute a judgment of the appellate court awarding attorney's
fees on an appeal without any express direction by the appellate court
to carry out the execution.93
B. Rights to Alimony
Although a wife might not be entitled to attorneys' fees for prosecut-
ing a counterclaim for separate maintenance because of the wording of
a property settlement agreement, she will be entitled to them in the de-
fense of divorce proceedings brought against her. 4
A plaintiff wife may be awarded attorneys' fees even though she
is unsuccessful in her divorce suit, and it would seem that there need
not be any correlation between the amount of the attorneys' fees and
the amount of alimony awarded to her. 8
86. Rule 3.16 (e), Florida Appellate Rules.
87. Anderson v. Anderson, 180 So.2d 360 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); for further proceedings,
see Anderson v. Anderson, 194 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1967).
88. Salomon v. Salomon, 186 So.2d 39 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
89. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 179 So.2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
90. FLA. STAT. § 76.09 (1965).
91. Papadakos v. Spooner, 186 So.2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
92. FLA. STAT. § 59.27 (1965).
93. Harrison v. Harrison, 178 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
94. Seraydar v. Seraydar, 178 So.2d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
95. Hall v. Hall, 200 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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C. Criteria for the Award
When the parties have reconciled before any testimony has been
taken, it is an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to award seventy-five
dollars per hour for eight hundred hours' work by the wife's attorney (a
total of $60,000) when only six hours were spent in court appearances,
about two hundred hours out of the eight hundred were expended by a
law school student, and another two hundred and eighty hours were ex-
pended by an associate and others in the attorney's law firm. The dis-
trict court reduced the fee by twenty thousand dollars.9 It is error for a
chancellor to award attorney's fees based upon valuations made in af-
fidavits of lawyers and upon the arguments of the attorneys seeking
the award, because the award of attorney's fees must be based upon testi-
mony which is subject to cross-examination. 7 On the other hand, expert
testimony is not required in every case for the initial award of attorney's
fees pendente lite.98 It is error for a chancellor to grant attorney's fees
to the wife in the absence of any pleadings seeking this item and in the
absence of any evidence presented to support an award. 9
D. Allocating Fees Between the Parties
It is not an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to order a husband
to pay his wife's attorney's fees even though the wife may be financially
able to pay them, and, conversely, it will not be an abuse of discretion
if the chancellor should refuse to do so.'0° Further, a chancellor may
order the husband to pay one-half of his wife's attorney's fees in a divorce
action even though the wife is financially able to pay them.''
E. Fees Subsequent to Divorce
A wife is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred in
directly and successfully attacking the validity of her husband's Mexi-
can divorce. 0 2 The wife is entitled to an award of attorney's fees when
a husband brings suit to modify as well as clarify a property settlement
agreement which the parties had amended subsequent to a divorce decree
which adopted the original agreement." 3 When a former wife brings a
petition for a rule to show cause against her former husband to enforce
provisions of a separation agreement, the chancellor may deny attorney's
fees to the wife when the proceedings primarily concern a business mat-
ter between the parties. 0 4
96. Novack v. Novack, 189 So.2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); writ of cert. discharged,
Novack v. Novack, 195 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1967).
97. Thoni v. Thoni, 179 So.2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
98. Muskin v. Muskin, 184 So.2d 923 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
99. Fairall v. Fairall, 178 So.2d 339 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
100. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 179 So.2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
101. Bencomo v. Bencomo, 195 So.2d 874 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
102. Pollack v. Pollack, 184 So.2d 915 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
103. Ash v. Ash, 193 So.2d 677 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
104. Albert v. Albert, 196 So.2d 809 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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F. Interest on Award
A final decree awarding attorney's fees automatically includes inter-
est at the rate of six per cent per annum until paid. °5
VII. ANTENUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The third district has held that when an antenuptial agreement pro-
vided that the wife gave up her dower and homestead rights in the "lands,
messuages, tenements, and hereditaments"' 1 of the husband these words
were susceptible to more than one interpretation. As a result, it was error
to enter a summary decree in favor of the widow on the basis that these
words covered only real property of the deceased husband.
When an antenuptial agreement is designed to commingle the prop-
erty of the spouses by having each of them create an estate by the en-
tirety in their separate property but this purpose is frustrated when one
spouse acts inconsistently and the other spouse acquiesces in these acts,
a court may declare that the agreement has been rescinded by mutual
consent." 7
B. Postnuptial Agreements
1. VALIDITY AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden is on the person seeking to set aside a property settle-
ment to prove that it was entered into by the fraud, deceit, duress,
coercion or overreaching of the other spouse. This is particularly true
when the wife has an intimate knowledge of the husband's financial worth
and she may not, therefore, claim ignorance on her part or non-disclosure
by her husband as a reason for setting the agreement aside.' 8
In an apparent holding of first impression, the second district has
held that if a separation agreement is on its face unreasonable with
respect to the wife, the husband has the burden of establishing its valid-
ity. The court held that when the husband was an attorney possessing
superior knowledge and skill; when the wife received nothing tangible
for the relinquishment of her rights in valuable corporate stock; when
the transfer occurred during the pendency of a divorce suit and the con-
sideration for the transfer-the forgiveness of the wife's misconduct by
105. Coggan v. Coggan, 183 So.2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
106. Mead v. Mead, 193 So.2d 476, 477, 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
107. McMullen v. McMullen, 185 So.2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
108. Pemelman v. Pemelman, 186 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966); compare with Del
Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962), which dealt with an antenuptial agree-
ment. Accord, Fisher v. Fisher, 199 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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the husband-had failed because of her subsequent misconduct, the trans-
fer was unreasonable on its face and the husband would have to sustain
the burden of proving its validity."0 9
It is error for a chancellor to refuse to admit a separation agree-
ment into evidence at a divorce hearing when the pleadings raise no
issue as to its validity and it appears to be properly executed. After the
agreement is admitted into evidence it can be attacked under proper
pleadings as being invalid because of duress, coercion, fraud or lack of
full disclosure." 0 A wife may bring a declaratory decree action against
her mentally incompetent husband to test the validity of a postnuptial
agreement allegedly obtained by his fraud, concealment and overreach-
ing.' l
Even in the absence of fraud, duress or coercion, a chancellor may
invalidate a provision in a "Separate Property Agreement" whereby the
wife relinquished all rights to alimony and support on the grounds that
it is "unconscionable" as lacking "consideration.""' Inasmuch as the
husband transferred property to the wife and gave her money pursuant
to other provisions of the agreement, it is difficult to comprehend how
the court decided that there was no consideration; it would appear that
the court does not understand the concept.
2. MODIFICATION
When a property settlement agreement provides that the former
husband is to make monthly payments to the former wife which shall
terminate if she ceases to own and live in the former residence of the
parties and the parties have relinquished claims in each other's property,
the monthly payments would not be subject to modification by court
order because of a change in conditions other than those mentioned
in the agreement."'
If alimony payments as provided for in a separation agreement
have been reduced by court order because of a decrease in the former
husband's earnings, it is unreasonable for the court to refuse to increase
the alimony payments to the amounts specified in the separation agree-
ment when the former husband's income now equals or exceeds his in-
come at the time of the separation agreement." 4
109. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 179 So.2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
110. Rouse v. Rouse, 192 So.2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
111. Gormley v. Gormley, 187 So.2d 676 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966). The court, in a rather
tongue-in-cheek opinion, upheld the sufficiency of the complaint in accordance with the
requirements of the case of Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
112. Gelfo v. Gelfo, 198 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
113. Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1967), aff'g Salomon v. Salomon, 186
So.2d 39 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
114. Nixon v. Nixon, 200 So.2d 263 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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The somewhat common misconception of many lawyers that alimony
provisions in a "property settlement agreement" may not be modified sub-
sequently by court order should be eliminated by the lucid decision in
Ohmes v. Ohmes,"' which held that section 65.16 (now section 61.14)
of the Florida Statutes becomes a part of every property settlement
agreement. Therefore, the alimony provisions are subject to modification
upon a showing of substantial change in the financial affairs of the par-
ties even though the court might not have expressly reserved jurisdiction
in the divorce decree which approved the property settlement agreement.
3. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENT
The third district has construed the following wording in a property
settlement agreem1ent:16
In addition to the above provisions [payments of education ex-
pense for the children], the husband will pay to the wife the
sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) an-
nually for each child, until each of said children marries, said
sums to be paid in monthly installments.
as requiring the husband to continue to make the support payments even
after the children have become twenty-one and self-employed, but not
yet married. Under this holding, it is mandatory for a property settle-
ment agreement to spell out that the father is not liable for the support
of his children after they reach their majority.
4. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
A complaint for specific performance which alleges that a former
husband and his former wife entered into a property settlement agree-
ment whereby the husband conveyed his interest in the home to the wife
and she agreed to execute a note and mortgage to him states a cause of
action even though the parties were divorced, remarried and then di-
vorced again and neither final decree of divorce approved or rejected
the property settlement agreement. 7
VIII. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
In the absence of an award of temporary alimony in a suit by the
wife for alimony unconnected with divorce under the Florida statutes,
it is error for the chancellor to award the wife a sum of money as arrear-
115. 200 So.2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
116. Vineberg v. Vineberg, 177 So.2d 367, 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
117. Wagner v. Wagner, 196 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967). See Staples v. Staples,
184 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), which affirmed the actions of the chancellor in refusing
to hold a former husband in contempt for failure to pay monthly installments of a property
settlement agreement to a wife who was dead at the time of the institution of the contempt
proceedings.
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ages for temporary alimony, even though the parties may have had some
kind of an informal agreement providing for the husband to support
the wife during the action." 8
When a decree of separate maintenance gives the wife exclusive
possession of the marital home for her benefit and the benefit of the chil-
dren, and the decree reserves jurisdiction for the purpose of modifying
the decree in the future, the chancellor should, upon a showing of a
change of circumstances, modify the decree or provide that the husband
make repairs on the home and to maintain it in a reasonable condition.
On the other hand, the chancellor is justified in refusing to order the
husband to provide an automobile for his wife and to pay for life insur-
ance on his life for the benefit of his wife and children when the original
decree of separate maintenance made no provision for these matters." 9
IX. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
A. Custody
1. JURISDICTION
The fact that a plaintiff-husband has voluntarily dismissed his com-
plaint for divorce does not prevent the court from awarding temporary
custody of the children to the wife and awarding child support and
maintenance to her in accordance with her motion (which was filed prior
to the voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 1.35 (a) (2) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure), the inherent power of the equity court over
children and section 65.14 of the Florida Statutes.'20
2. CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD
A chancellor's compassionate concern over the emotional strain and
monetary expense incurred by a mother in prior child custody proceed-
ings wherein she was denied custody and his apprehension that she would
suffer additional strain and expense in any subsequent custody proceed-
ings is not enough to justify the chancellor in taking custody from the
paternal grandparents and awarding it to her.' 2 '
When the wife-mother is suffering from a personality disorder and
a fifteen-year-old son expresses a decided preference for living with his
father, a chancellor is justified in granting custody to the father.'22 A
chancellor may award custody of children to a father without making a
specific finding that the mother is unfit to have custody,'2- and when
118. Quarngesser v. Quarngesser, 177 So.2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), construing FLA.
STAT. § 65.09 (1963).
119. Fleming v. Fleming, 177 So.2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
120. Cooper v. Cooper, 194 So.2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
121. Garner v. Garner, 193 So.2d 673 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
122. Borden v. Borden, 193 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
123. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 179 So.2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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both parents are fit, the custody of young children should be awarded
to their mother.124 Although an adulterous wife may not be a fit wife,
she may otherwise be a fit mother for young children and should be
given their custody. 25
3. FOREIGN DECREES
It is well established that a child custody decree of a foreign state
is not necessarily entitled to full faith and credit in Florida because it
is interlocutory in nature and subject to modification in the best interests
of the child. As a result, it is error for a Florida chancellor who has
jurisdiction over the child because of his presence in this state to refuse
to consider the question of custody and to order the return of the child
to the foreign state. The chancellor may consider the foreign decree as
one factor in deciding the custody issue in Florida, and he may enforce
the foreign decree under the principle of comity only after he has deter-
mined that it is in the best interest of the child to do so.
We note several guidelines for determining whether a foreign
decree is entitled to recognition under the comity principle in a
custody case. They are: 1) the length of time which has elapsed
since the decree; 2) whether the custody issue was actively
litigated by the same parties now before the court; and 3)
whether there has been a change in any material circumstances
affecting the fitness of the parties relevant to the custody of the
child. 126
An authenticated copy of a California interlocutory divorce decree
awarding custody which is attached to an answer is a part of the court
record, and the court may take judicial notice of it even though it was
not formally introduced into evidence.'27
4. DIVIDED AND "SPLIT-CUSTODY" PROVISIONS
The first district has articulated the view that a custody order may
provide for divided custody and "split-custody" (two children with one
parent and two children with the other) in unusual situations. 28 It is not
an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to award custody of three sons,
ranging in age from nine to fifteen years old, to the father, and awarding
custody of a seventeen-year-old daughter to her mother when this is in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the children and other relevant
facts.12
9
124. Julian v. Julian, 188 So.2d 896 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
125. McAnespie v. McAnespie, 200 So.2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
126. Morris v. Kridel, 179 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Fox v. Fox, 179 So,2d
103 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
127. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 200 So.2d 643 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
128. Brackin v. Brackin, 190 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
129. Pollak v. Pollak, 196 So.2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
FAMILY LAW
5. VISITATION RIGHTS
It is not erroneous for a final decree of divorce to provide that a
former husband shall have visitation rights with his minor child "at rea-
sonable times and places, which may be in or out of the State of Flor-
ida" when the husband failed to ask for definite visitation rights during
the course of the proceedings or by petition for rehearing. 130 An order
which grants weekend visitation rights to a non-parent (grandparent)
of a child whose custody has been awarded to a fit parent is unjustified
and unenforceable against the parent who fails to abide by the order.
Further, when a child is adopted by a stepmother any rights of visitation
or partial custody granted to a non-parent (grandparent) are negated
insofar as the stepmother is concerned and are not enforceable against
her or the child's father.' 3 '
6. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS
In the absence of a residence restriction in the custody provision of
a final decree of divorce, the juvenile court, upon receiving jurisdiction
of the case from the circuit court, has no right to require the custodian
of the child to keep him in Florida or to post a surety bond to insure
performance of this restriction in the absence of a change of circum-
stance occurring since the divorce decree.3 2
7. CHANGE OF CUSTODY
It would appear that although a chancellor has the power to change
custody upon an emergency basis pending a full hearing upon a petition
for change in custody, it may be considered erroneous to do so.'
8. WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
A divorced woman who has been granted custody of her child has a
legal cause of action for its death even though the divorced father con-
tributed to the support of the child and exercised his visitation rights.
Further, when the mother has been appointed administratrix of the child
and brings suit as mother and as administratrix of the child, the father
has no interest in the litigation and may not intervene. 34
9. LEGISLATION
When one parent petitions for a change in the name of his or her
minor child and the other parent is a non-resident of Florida, construc-
130. Smith v. Smith, 177 So.2d 351, 352 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
131. Lee v. Kepler, 197 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
132. In re E. P., 186 So.2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
133. Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 178 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
134. Jordan v. Jordan, 187 So.2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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tive service of process may now be used to notify the non-resident parent
of the petition." 5
B. Support
1. JURISDICTION
A trial court does not have jurisdiction to enter an order decreeing
a trust in jointly held property and, in effect, making a property settle-
ment (part of which was for the support of the children to the marriage)
in a post-decretal proceeding twenty-two months after a final decree of
divorce, even though the final decree reserved jurisdiction as to custody
and support of the children of the marriage." 6
2. FOREIGN DECREES
When a former wife brings suit in Florida to establish a foreign
decree providing for child support payments, to collect for arrearages
under this foreign decree and to increase the amount of these payments,
the Florida court may establish the foreign decree as a Florida decree but
refuse to enter an award for arrearages based on equitable defenses
such as a subsequent modification by the parties.3 7
A former wife may not secure a Florida judgment based upon an
Illinois award of child support when the Illinois court subsequently takes
custody of the child from her and grants it to her former husband. The
subsequent Illinois decree did not expressly relieve the husband from
the duty of continuing child support payments, but the Florida court
construed the Illinois decree as impliedly relieving the former husband
from the mandates of the first decree. 88
A California paternity and support decree which is not subject
to collateral attack in California is also not subject to collateral attack
in Florida when a proceeding is brought in Florida under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law to make the California decree
a domestic one.8 9
3. INSURANCE POLICIES
A provision in a final decree of divorce which requires a husband-
father to "maintain and keep current with his employment any and all
policies on his life, which such policies shall be made payable to the minor
135. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-475, S.B. No. 1261, amending section 69.02(6) of the
Florida Statutes (1967).
136. Ayers v. Ayers, 191 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
137. Smith v. Smith, 197 So.2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
138. Cassidy v. Cassidy, 181 So.2d 179 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
139. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 198 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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child"'"4 operates to vest in his child an indefeasible interest in a term
group insurance contract of the husband's employer. This rule governs
even though the father never notified the insurance company of a change
of beneficiary from his second wife to his son and a new insurance com-
pany was substituted for the original one.
4. ENFORCEMENT
In a case of first impression, the third district has held that the
Florida constitutional one thousand dollar personal property exemption
from forced sale may be asserted by a former husband who has re-mar-
ried when a writ of execution is issued upon a judgment obtained by a
former wife for arrearages of child support provided in a final decree of
divorce. 4' It would appear that the only practical means of enforcement
is through the contempt powers of the court.
An interesting illustration of the dichotomy between an attempt to
modify retroactively a child support order and the attempted enforce-
ment of the same order by contempt was presented in Boyle v. Boyle. 42
A mother had been awarded custody of her minor son, and the father
was ordered to make child support payments. Subsequently, the son, age
twenty, took up his abode with his father, and the father stopped making
support payments to his former wife. The former wife then filed con-
tempt proceedings against the father, and he was adjudged in contempt.
The third district held that a court has no power to modify retroactively
a child support order upon the petition of the husband. On the other
hand, the court has the discretion to refuse to use its contempt power
to force compliance in paying the arrearages of child support depending
upon the facts of the case. However, the court refused to disturb the
discretion of the chancellor in holding the father in contempt because
of the factual setting of the case.
It is within the sound discretion of a chancellor to hold that a former
wife has "waived" her rights to arrearages in child support payments
when she has acquiesced in the actions of her second husband who re-
fused visitation rights to the father and who insisted that he alone would
support the children and did so until he disappeared. In effect, the notion
that unpaid child support is a "vested property right" is an overstate-
ment; it may become "unvested" by subsequent conduct of the parties.'43
A sentence of a five hundred dollar fine or four months in jail for
contempt of court by a husband who failed to deposit support payments
in the registry of the court is excessive when the facts showed that the
140. Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So.2d 478, 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), cert. denied, 194 So.2d
897 (Fla. 1967). Compare Cadore v. Cadore, 67 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1953).
141. Azar v. Graham, 194 So.2d 684 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
142. 194 So.2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
143. Warrick v. Hender, 198 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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husband had lived with and supported his dependents during the period
when he failed to deposit the support payments in the court registry.
"The order of commitment here is in the nature of punishment for a con-
tempt more technical than real."'
1 44
The general extradition statute of Florida requires that the demand-
ing state allege that the accused was present in the demanding state at the
time of the alleged crime.' 45 However, under the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Law14 extradition may be made even though the
accused was not in the demanding state at the time of the commission
of the crime and although he has not fled from the demanding state. 47
Prima facie evidence of fraud exists when a father who is in arrears
in the payment of child support conveys real property for a nominal
consideration to a relative.'48
X. ADOPTION
The Florida statutes'49 require that a juvenile court judge must make
and recite in his order specific findings of facts as a prerequisite for per-
manently removing children from their parents and placing them with a
licensed child placing agency for adoption.5 0 Advanced age will not per
se serve as an automatic disqualification of a person who seeks to adopt
a minor. For example, in unusual circumstances a person aged sixty-eight
may be approved as an adopting parent.'' It is proper to permit a step-
father to adopt a child over the objections of the natural father who
has abandoned his child by failing to support him and by attempting to
communicate with him on only one occasion. 5 2
Formal legal documents wherein a natural mother has consented
to the adoption of her child should ordinarily be respected by the courts
and should not be set aside for frivolous or inconsequential reasons. How-
ever, when a natural mother executes such an instrument agreeing to the
adoption of her child by the child's grandmother and grandfather (the
parents of the natural mother), there is a strained relationship between
the mother and her parents and the agreement was executed when the
mother was young and intellectually immature, a court will be justified
in allowing a revocation of the agreement by the mother especially when
144. State v. Boyer, 180 So.2d 165, 166 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
145. FLA. STAT. Ch. 941.03 (1965).
146. FLa. STAT. § 88.061 (1965).
147. Cox v. State, 186 So.2d 467 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
148. Gyorok v. Davis, 183 So.2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), applying FLa. STAT. § 726.01
(1965).
149. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(1)(d) (1965).
150. In re G. S., A. S., and R. S. v. State, 190 So.2d 603 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
151. In re Adoption of Christian, 184 So.2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
152. In re Adoption of Layton, 196 So.2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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she shows a change in circumstances arising since the execution of the
consent agreement. 153
A non-consenting parent has the right to present arguments against
the adoption of his child by others even though he has not presented his
formal answer to the adoption petition within the proper time. Further,
a petition for adoption over the protests of the natural father should not
be granted unless there is clear and convincing evidence that he has
abandoned his child, or he is unfit, or that it is "manifestly in the interest
of the child to allow the adoption in favor of strangers."" 4
Sections 72.07-.09, 72.041, 72.10-.12, 72.14-.18, 72.20-.22, 72.24,
72.25, 72.27-.30, and 72.32-.39 of the Florida Statutes, which dealt with
adoption, have been transferred to chapter 63, Florida Statutes and are
renumbered 63.011-.031, 63.041, 63.051-.071, 63.081-.121, 63.131-.151,
63.161, 63.171, 63.181-.211 and 63.211-.291. In addition, renumbered sec-
tions 63.081, 63.101-.161, 63.181, 63.201, 63.211, 63.231, 63.241 and
63.261-.291 were amended in minor detail as to adoption procedures.'55
Section 72.18 of the former Florida Statutes (section 63.121 of the
re-numbered 1967 version of the adoption statutes) was amended to pro-
vide that the court may, upon a showing of impracticability, excuse either
or both petitioners for adoption and the adoptee who is twelve years of
age or older from attending the adoption hearing. 5"
XI. JUVENILE COURTS AND JUVENILES
A. Jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts
Another chapter was written in the overlapping jurisdictional morass
between the juvenile and circuit courts in Lewison v. State.157 In Lewison
the Broward County Juvenile Court adjudicated that a child was a de-
pendent child and awarded temporary custody to the mother. The mother
then moved to Dade County and instituted divorce proceedings. The
I)ade County Circuit Court awarded custody to the mother and trans-
ferred the custody portion of the decree to the Dade County Juvenile
Court. The mother placed her child in the home of a couple who later
petitioned for adoption of the child in the Dade County Circuit Court.
Subsequent to the commencement of the adoption proceedings, the
Broward County Juvenile Court issued a Rule to Show Cause directed
to the mother and ordered that the child be brought back to Broward
County. The child was brought back. The Dade County Circuit Court
then ordered that custody be returned to the adopting couple and that
153. In re Adoption of Arnold, 184 So.2d 192 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
154. In re Adoption of Shaw, 198 So.2d 87, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
155. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, S.B. No. 441.
156. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-390, S.B. No. 845.
157. 193 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
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the child be brought back from Broward County. The Broward County
Juvenile Court then held the attorney for the mother in indirect con-
tempt because of his actions in the Dade County Circuit Court. The
fourth district held that although the jurisdiction of the juvenile and cir-
cuit courts may overlap in some instances, the Broward County Juvenile
Court had jurisdiction only in cases involving a child's delinquency or
dependency. At best, the jurisdiction of the Broward Juvenile Court was
concurrent with the Dade County Circuit Court and not exclusive. Fur-
thermore, the adoption proceedings in the Circuit Court are neither con-
nected with nor controlled by the prior custody award in the Juvenile
Court. The Broward County Juvenile Court may still have had some
limited jurisdiction over the case, but the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
for Dade County was unaffected. As a result, the attorney for the mother
was within his rights in representing the mother in the Dade County
Circuit Court and, therefore, not in contempt of the Broward County
Juvenile Court.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County has
jurisdiction to modify a final decree of a circuit court involving child
custody even though the child is not delinquent or dependent when
jurisdiction is transferred to the juvenile court by the circuit court. 58
But the Dade County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court does not
have jurisdiction to increase a child support award of a circuit court
when the father has complied with the decree of the circuit court. 59
An order of the juvenile court which awards temporary custody of
a child to the father, on the basis that the child is a dependent child, will
not necessarily preclude a permanent award of custody by the circuit
court in divorce proceedings. 60
A child, for whom custody and support provisions have been made
in the circuit court in a divorce proceeding, may thereafter be adjudged
a dependent or delinquent child in a juvenile court. The jurisdiction of
a juvenile court usually depends upon delinquency or dependency while
support of a child in divorce proceedings in the circuit court is adjudi-
cated without such determination. Hence, the causes of action are differ-
ent and the jurisdiction is different. As a result of this reasoning, a father
who is in arrears in making child support payments as ordered by the
circuit court in its divorce decree may be ordered subsequently by a juve-
nile court to make support payments to his "dependent children" and
may be held in civil contempt of the juvenile court if he fails to do so."'
Prohibition will lie only to prevent a court from acting without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. It may not be used as a substitute for an appeal
158. State v. Chastain, 197 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
159. In re McG., 188 So.2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
160. In re G. K. L., 194 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
161. In re S. L. T., R. L. T., R. L. T., 180 So.2d 374 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). McNatt, As-
sociate Judge, concurring specially, was of the opinion that the juvenile court did not have
jurisdiction. Accord, In re S. T. P., D. K. P., 149 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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from a custody award of a juvenile court which may be erroneous but
not void.16 2
Although a juvenile court is empowered to order an allegedly de-
pendent child to undergo psychiatric or psychological examinations, the
court has no power to order similar examinations of his parents. As a
result, it is error for a juvenile court judge to "permit" the parents to
submit to these examinations upon condition that if they fail to do so the
child will be placed with a child placing agency for adoption.'6
B. Procedure
A Florida statute provides that no child taken into custody who has
not been adjudicated to be a dependent or delinquent child shall be de-
tained in custody longer than two days unless a special order of the
judge finds that the release of the child would be inimical to the welfare
of the child or the public. 64 The reasons for the findings of the judge are
subject to review by appeal or in habeas corpus proceedings. The third
district has held that this statute means that a juvenile court judge is not
required to conduct a hearing within this two-day period when a juve-
nile has been adjudicated a delinquent in three prior cases, even though
he had fully complied with the punishment or probation accorded him
in these cases.'65 This holding seems most unfortunate in that once a
child has been adjudicated a delinquent (even though he has paid for his
sins), he may be confined on a new charge without any effective means
to secure a hearing or release.
C. Appeals
Under Florida Statutes, section 39.03(7) the time for taking an ap-
peal from an order of the juvenile court was ten days rather than the
sixty-day period provided for general appeals. The statute has been re-
pealed and the time for taking an appeal is now governed by the Florida
Appellate Rules.166
D. Criminal and Delinquency Proceedings
1. JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURTS vis a vis THE CRIMINAL
COURTS
A juvenile who has not reached his seventeenth birthday at the time
of arraignment or at the time he allegedly committed a crime may not
be tried by a criminal court unless the juvenile court judge transfers
162. State v. Yergey, 188 So.2d 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
163. In re D. A. W., 178 So.2d 745 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), applying FLA. STAT. § 39.08
(1965).
164. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7) (1965).
165. State v. Dennis, 185 So.2d 12 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
166. In re D. A. W., 186 So.2d 786 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966), aff'd, 193 So.2d 433 (Fla.
1967), applying FLA. STAT. § § 39.14(2) and 59.08 (1965). FTA. LAWS ch. 67-175 provides
for the repeal of all statutes prescribing time for taking an appeal.
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jurisdiction over the minor to the criminal court pursuant to a Florida
statute." 7
This statute was amended to provide that if any child, who is four-
teen years of age or older, is brought into the juvenile court charged with
an act which would be a felony if he were an adult, then the juvenile
court judge may waive jurisdiction and transfer the child to the appro-
priate criminal court. However, this waiver may not be made until a
hearing is conducted as to the desirability of waiving jurisdiction. When
the waiver is based upon social histories, psychological or psychiatric
reports, the child, his parents, guardian or counsel shall have a right to
question the parties responsible for the preparation of these reports. The
juvenile court judge shall also waive jurisdiction if the child and at least
one parent or his guardian or counsel demand that jurisdiction be waived.
Finally, if the child is indicted by a grand jury for a capital offense,
the juvenile court shall be without jurisdiction and the child shall be
handled as if he were an adult. 8
2. RIGHT iO COUNSEL
In a long overdue decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that a juvenile charged with delinquency in a juvenile court
has a right at the trial stage to be notified of the charges, the right to
retain counsel or to have counsel appointed to represent him, the right to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and the privilege against
self-incrimination.'69 This decision should result in the tacit overruling
of the unhappy decision of In re T.W.P., 7° which held that a juvenile
may be committed to the Florida School for Boys for the duration
of his minority for his delinquent acts without being given the benefit
of counsel. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari on this case because the boy had been released
and the case was moot.' 7 '
3. NOTICE TO PARENTS OR GUARDIAN
In order to determine whether a convicted person was an unmarried
minor at the time of his trial and, if so, whether his parents or guardian
were notified of his trial pursuant to the Florida statute,'72 evidentiary
hearings are needed under Criminal Procedure Rule I, and the judge
may not make a finding that the parents or guardian were notified from
a mere examination of the original trial record.1 17
167. Wade v. State, 184 So.2d 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), applying FLA. STAT. § 39.02
(1965).
168. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-71, S.B. No. 66.
169. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
170. 184 So.2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
171. In re T. W. P., 388 U.S. 912 (1967).
172. FLA. STAT. § 932.38 (1957).
173. Ziegler v. State, 180 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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When the conviction of a minor is a nullity because of the state's
failure to notify his parents or guardian as required by statute, and the
minor made a post-conviction statement in order to mitigate his sentence
in these void proceedings, it is error to introduce this statement against
the minor in a subsequent trial and it is a denial of due process.17'
When the parents of a minor child have received notice of criminal
offenses charged against him, and four years have elapsed since the giving
of notice, the minor may be arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced
without any further notice being given to the parents.'75
4. LEGISLATION
Section 39.12(2) of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide
that the juvenile courts shall furnish statistical data to the department
of statistics and research of the division of youth services. 176
Under an amendment to section 39.11 (1) (e) of the Florida Statutes,
the parents, guardian, etc., of a child who has been committed to the
state industrial school for boys or girls may now be ordered by the juve-
nile court to make payments to these institutions for the care and sup-
port of the child. 77
Section 39.03 (6) of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide
for the taking and compiling of fingerprints of juveniles over the age of
fourteen who are adjudicated delinquent and who have committed an
act which would be a felony if they were adults. 178
Juvenile court judges may now authorize the publication of proceed-
ings in juvenile court hearings with the exception of cases dealing with
unwed mothers or placement of illegitimate children. 179
Section 39.01 of the Florida Statutes was amended in a rather curi-
ous way.'8 0 A "delinquent child" now means "a child who commits a viola-
tion of law, regardless of where the violation occurred." The amendment
then goes on to define a "child in need of supervision" as a child:
[W]ho is incorrigible; or is a persistent truant from school; or
who is beyond the control of the child's parent or other legal
custodian; or who associates with criminals, reputed criminals,
or vicious or immoral persons; or is growing up in idleness or
crime; or whose occupation, behavior or associations are such
as to injure or endanger the welfare of the child or the welfare
174. Brooks v. State, 183 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
175. Falagon v. State, 186 So.2d 804 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
176. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-60, S.B. No. 67.
177. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-61, S.B. No. 68.
178. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-116, H.B. No. 172.
179. Fla Laws 1967, ch. 67-509, S.B. No. 45, amending FLA STAT. § 39.09 (1965).
180. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-585, S.B. No. 1505, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (1965).
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of others; or who is found in a place predominately used for sell-
ing intoxicating drinks for consumption on the premises.
Then, to confuse matters, the amendment provides that "a child alleged
for a second time before a juvenile court to have committed an act de-
fined [above] . . . may be alleged to be a delinquent child." Does this
mean, for example, that a child who is twice accused of "growing up in
idleness" has committed a violation of the law? The courts should have
a merry field day with this legislative nightmare.
XII. GUARDIANSHIP
A. Jurisdiction
The domicile of a resident ward is the county in which the guardian
of the person was lawfully appointed, and this domicile may be changed
only upon order of the county judge based upon a petition of the guardian
of the person showing good cause for a change of domicile. Relatives of
the ward may not unilaterally remove the ward to a foreign state and
then offer proof after the death of the ward that he had sufficient capacity
to change his domicile to the foreign state.'"
The circuit court may have jurisdiction over a suit brought against
a guardian which seeks a resulting or constructive trust, an accounting,
and injunctive relief, all based upon a wilful conversion of the ward's
property allegedly committed before and during the guardian's tenure
when it is shown that adequate relief may not be granted in the county
judge's court. 82
A court-ordered settlement of property rights between a husband
and wife during the continuance of their marriage when the husband was
an adjudged incompetent is void ab initio as rendered in excess of the
county judge's jurisdiction. The fact that the judge's order of settlement
was made pursuant to a stipulation of the wife and her husband's guard-
ian does not change this result because jurisdiction may not be conferred
on a court by the agreement of the parties. 83
Under the inherent power of a court of equity, a chancellor may
appoint a guardian ad litem for "absent and possibly incompetent par-
ties" even though these parties have not been adjudicated incompetent
in the county judge's court. 4
B. Procedure
Faced with an ambiguity in the Florida statutes,"' the second dis-
trict has held that an alleged incompetent has the right to examine a
181. In re Estate of Phillips, 190 So.2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966); compare with Mat-
thews v. Matthews, 141 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
182. King v. King, 178 So.2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
183. Miller v. Eatmon, 177 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
184. Peppard v. Peppard, 198 So.2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
185. FLA. STAT. § §394.22 (4) and 394.22(9) (1965).
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physician's report which was used by the trial court in determining the
question of his competency. 8 '
Due process has not been afforded alleged incompetents when the
notice of hearing to adjudicate their competency was served on them on
the same day as the hearing and when there was no evidence that they
were violent or likely to harm themselves or others so as to require an
immediate hearing.'87
C. The "Totten Trust" and the Guardian
The county judge's court has no jurisdiction over an action (against
the guardian of the minor beneficiary) brought by the executors of the
estate of a deceased creator of a Totten Trust who claim that the will of
the deceased revoked the Totten Trust. Such jurisdiction rests in the cir-
cuit court. 8
The guardian of an incompetent who, prior to the order adjudicating
the incompetency, established a Totten Trust does not have authority
to withdraw the funds from the trust unless a court orders the revocation
of the Totten Trust because the funds are required for the support and
care of the incompetent-trustee. 89
D. Guardian's and Attorney's Fees
When a guardian contracts to sell real .property of the ward which
is located in a foreign state and the attorney for the purchaser in this
foreign state performed legal services in having the sale approved by the
appropriate court of this foreign state, he is entitled to attorney's fees
on an implied contract of employment under section 745.33 of the Florida
Statutes. Even if there were no implied contract of employment, fees
could still be awarded on a quantum meruit basis. 90
E. Legislation
Section 394.192 of the Florida Statutes was adopted to provide for
criminal sanctions against persons who falsely conspire to secure the
involuntary hospitalization of persons who are not mentally ill, and sec-
tions 394.191, 394.20 and 394.201, which deal with the hospitalization
of mentally ill persons, were amended as to the use of private hospitals,
emergency and non-emergency hospitalization of the mentally ill, pay-
ment for their care, release procedures, etc.' 91
186. Whealton v. Whealton, 184 So.2d 228 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
187. In re Guardianship of Swain, 199 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967). Rawls, C. J.,
dissenting, was of the view that the county judge never had jurisdiction over the persons of
the incompetents because of the inadequate notice.
188. In re Estate of Young, 199 So.2d 115 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
189. First Nat'l Bank v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 196 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1967).
190. Dierickx v. Wisehart, 195 So.2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
191. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-7, H.B. No. 22.
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An act was adopted which gives the county judge the power to ap-
point a guardian of property for a physically incompetent person who is
incapable of managing his own estate. The county judge is empowered to
act solely upon the petition of the physically incompetent, and the order
appointing a guardian shall be made without adjudicating that the person
is incompetent.'92 The statute seems a bit paradoxical.
Section 744.20 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
the county judge may within his discretion appoint an attorney as guard-
ian ad litem for property of an alleged incompetent nonresident.'93
Section 745.15 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
the county judge may authorize guardians to transfer the separate prop-
erty of an incompetent wife without the joinder of her husband when
there is a need to do so in order to provide support for her.'94
Under amended section 744.64 of the Florida Statutes, the county
judge may now authorize the use of the ward's funds for the last illness
and burial of the ward's dependents. The amended statute gives a very
broad definition to the word "dependents."' 95
Florida Statute, section 745.03 (2) was amended to provide that the
county judge may authorize the reinvestment of the proceeds acquired by
a married incompetent ward from the sale of a home held by the entireties
into the purchase of another home held in the same manner.196
Sections 744.481, 744.482(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and 744.484
were added to the Florida Statutes to require a guardian to have his ward
examined annually by a licensed physician as to his mental and physical
condition unless the county judge orders, after hearing and notice, that
the examinations are not necessary. Examinations are not required for
wards who are maintained in a state institution.'97
Section 409.411 of the Florida Statutes was amended to permit the
receipt of welfare payments when the incompetent person is living in the
household of an adult member of his family or there is a responsible
person who will act in his behalf. In such cases, a guardian need not be
appointed. 198
Under an amendment to the Florida Statutes, the guardian may pay
from the ward's estate, subject to the approval of the county judge, rea-
sonable funeral expenses for the ward in an amount not to exceed seven
hundred and fifty dollars. 99
192. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-12, H.B. No. 14.
193. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-80, H.B. No. 201.
194. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-81, H.B. No. 202.
195. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-82, H.B. No. 203.
196. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-83, H.B. No. 205.
197. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-155, H.B. No. 45.
198. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-291, Comm. Substitute for S.B. No. 650.
199. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-391, S.B. No. 604, adding section 744.68 to the Florida
Statutes (1967).
FAMILY LAW
XIII. ILLEGITIMACY
A. Jurisdiction
The Florida statutes require that personal service of process upon
a minor must be made by the officer reading the summons to the minor
and also to the guardian or other person who has care or custody of the
minor.200 Hence, the reading of the summons in a bastardy action to the
mother of the minor defendant without reading it to him is improper serv-
ice of process. Further, a guardian ad litem must be appointed for the
minor defendant in order for the court to have jurisdiction over him in a
bastardy action."°0
B. Foreign Decrees
A bastardy decree of a sister state which adjudicates paternity is en-
titled to full faith and credit in Florida, and this foreign decree must be
established as a Florida decree if the mother of the child seeks to enforce
its support provisions in this state. Once the foreign decree has been made
a domestic decree, the mother may seek to modify the decree by having
the Florida court increase the amount of support payments even though
the mother and child are residents of the foreign state while the father
is now a resident of Florida. 20 2
The third district has held that a Florida court may lend its equitable
remedies on the basis of comity to enforce a decree of a court in the
Dominican Republic which held that the defendant is the father of an
illegitimate child and ordered him to make child support payments. The
dissenting opinion considered that the foreign decree was penal in nature
because it ordered the father's imprisonment for two years and the pri-
mary purpose of the foreign proceeding was punishment not compensa-
tion, and that comity should not be used to enforce foreign penal de-
crees. 
20
C. Visitation Rights
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the first district has
held that when a natural father acknowledges paternity of an illegitimate
child, is interested in its welfare and provides it with support, he should
be granted visitation rights unless it is shown that it would be detrimental
to the child's welfare. Further, it is proper for the chancellor to order
that the natural father be given notice of any adoption proceedings re-
garding this child."0 4
200. FLA. STAT. § § 47.23 and 47.24 (1965).
201. Flint v. Baker, 189 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
202. Mocher v. Rasmussen-Taxdal, 180 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
203. Cox v. Pow, 182 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
204. Mixon v. Mize, 198 So.2d 373 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
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D. Proof of Parentage
In bastardy proceedings, when the plaintiff-woman admits that she
had intercourse with another man as well as the defendant during the
medically recognized time in which conception may have occurred, the
trier of fact may not determine the fact of parentage based upon specula-
tion in the absence of medical facts showing which man was the father." 5
E. The "Tort" of Bastardy
In a case of first impression in Florida, the first district has held that
an illegitimate child has no cause of action against her natural father for
the illicit relations which he had with her mother which resulted in her
being born a bastard-a cause of action sounding in tort arising out of
acts causing one to be born in a state of illegitimacy. °6
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Tort Actions
A husband has a cause of action against a third party for the wrong-
ful death of his wife under the Florida statutes2°7 which will not be denied
him because his negligence or gross negligence caused or contributed to
her death. If a husband intentionally causes the death of his wife he may
not recover, but gross negligence may not be equated to an intentional
act.' o
A parent is not necessarily liable for the torts of his minor child
simply because he is a parent; however, it is a question of fact for the
jury to decide if it is negligent for a mother to entrust a stroller to her
five-year-old son with instructions to push it in a crowded department
store without supervision while she is shopping and the child pushes the
stroller into a female shopper, knocking her down and causing personal
injuries.29
In a somewhat similar vein, the fourth district has held that it is a
jury question whether it is negligence for the parents of a fourteen-year-
old boy (who allegedly deliberately shot a playmate) to leave a loaded
pistol in a place where the child had access to it during times of unsuper-
vised activity. The court expressly declined to hold that this conduct by
the parents was negligence as a matter of law, but that the jury was
authorized in finding a lack of due care by the parents.210
205. Yarmark v. Strickland, 193 So.2d 212 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
206. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
207. FLA.-STAT. § § 768.01 et. seq. (1965).
208. Strickland v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 194 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
209. Bullock v. Armstrong, 180 So.2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). This case itemizes the
four different situations in which a parent may be held liable for the torts of his minor child.
210. Seabrook v. Taylor, 199 So.2d 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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The Florida Supreme Court donned its medieval, myopic spectacles
and reaffirmed the common law rule that a former wife may not sue her
husband for an intentional tort committed against her during coverture.
The decision was avowedly based upon the "unity" or "merger" theory of
marriage and the desire to promote domestic felicity. The court admitted
that a wife could sue her husband for her separate property."1 ' There is
something radically wrong with the law which allows a wife to sue her
husband if he deliberately breaks her vase but denies her a remedy if he
deliberately breaks her back.
211. Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1967).
